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DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF A-REITS  






This paper contributes to the capital structure literature by investigating the determinants of capital structure of 
Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs) over the period 2006-2009. By using a panel approach and a 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) dummy variable, our analysis incorporates the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) shock 
which appears to have affected the market after December 2007. We find that A-REIT size, profitability, tangibility, 
operating risk and number of growth opportunities impact similarly to many previous studies of international entities 
upon the degree of leverage. We also find mixed support for prevailing capital structure theories of Pecking Order, 
Trade-off and Agency Theory, but find that Market Timing Theory can be rejected over our sample period. With specific 
focus after onset of the GFC, we find that the relationship between capital structure and our independent variables is 
somewhat distorted. Consequently, the postulations of theory also become distorted whereby changes to capital 
structure come about because of the primary goal to survive, rather than managerial opportunism.  
Keywords: A-REIT, Australia, capital structure, global financial crisis 
INTRODUCTION 
Past international studies of capital structure have yielded mixed results despite being performed during relatively stable 
economic periods. If one is to draw back on Modigliani and Miller (1958), this is not surprising given their assertion 
that capital structure is irrelevant to maximising the value of a company. Australian REITs have traditionally been 
structured as unit trusts so that if the trust‟s taxable income is distributed to the unit holders, then the trust itself does not 
pay any income tax. Only the unit holders are taxed. If the unit trust does not pay out all the taxable income, then a 
penalty rate of tax of nearly half of the undistributed income, is imposed on the trust. As such, the trusts generally pay 
out their taxable income to the unit holders. In the absence of having retained earnings, those entities wishing to grow 
need to attract costly debt capital or perhaps even more costly equity capital. Many trusts now offer stapled securities 
signifying a trust and company structure. The company must pay tax at corporate tax rates while the trust has the flow 
through to unit holders benefit described before. The company in the stapled structure can retain earnings. REITs tend 
to have a high proportion of tangible assets giving them more security to enable a greater degree of secured borrowing. 
Even in the absence of valuable tax deductions from taking on debt, the desire to maximise earnings per unit (EPU) 
makes debt more attractive than equity at certain earnings levels and where unit issues could substantially dilute the unit 
holder base, holding back desired EPU growth. 
In practice, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has exposed the failures of many highly levered entities, and urgent 
restructuring has placed doubt upon the ability of Modigliani and Miller‟s seminal work to remain robust over the 
vagaries of the global economic system. Determining the appropriate capital structure is not done in a static world. As 
has been seen many times over in the past, the financial world is susceptible to events that change the course of decision 
making for years to come, and every manager makes a decision where there is a trade off of one benefit or cost for 
another.  
The most recent event to affect the corporate world was the GFC. At the height of the economic cycle, liquidity was at 
its peak, and this abundance of funding impacted upon disciplined lending, re-financing and underwriting by many 
financial institutions, particularly in the evaluation of borrowers‟ capacity to repay. Further compounding this effect 
was reliance on rising asset values and persistently low interest rates. Once the property bubble burst in the United 
States, asset values fell, and this was followed by defaults among over-leveraged borrowers. The opaqueness of the 
underlying financial instruments and their trading on over-the-counter markets both nationally and internationally made 
losses hard to locate (LDW 2008). In terms of structural issues, there was over-reliance on self regulation, especially 
with the dramatic rise of non-bank financial institutions, and risk management was trivialised with increasing use of 
synthetic products and collateralised debt obligations. In summary, there was a trade off between expected higher 
efficiency of financial intermediation and the stability of the financial system, particularly with lack of due diligence 
emanating from compensation of excessive managerial risk taking. This phenomenon ultimately spread via transaction 
cost reduction, the subsequent rise in cross-border operations, and lack of co-ordinated global regulation.  
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The GFC has had a large impact on the Australian listed property sector, with market values having dropped in 2008 by 
an average of 65% from its peak a year earlier. Returns also suffered, dropping from an average of 20% just prior to the 
GFC to -50% in 2008-2009. A-REITs have traditionally been highly levered, with the debt levels rising from 30% in 
2001 to 52% in 2009 in pursuit of growth opportunities. Thus the scarcity of capital post GFC and the cost of debt 
remaining on offer has caused much doubt about how they will manage to continue operating when it comes time to re-
finance. As a result, there have been over $15 Billion worth of capital raisings in the entire A-REIT market since 
September 2008 in an attempt to reduce exposure to debt and reduce downward pressure on asset valuations. With a 
drop in asset values, the likelihood of breaching debt covenants is increased, making equity issues even more critical. 
Table 1 shows raisings of both equity and debt for our sample of 31 A-REITs over the 2005/06 to 2008/09 financial 
years. The figures were taken from formal announcements made on the Australian Stock Exchange. Equity figures 
include open market offers, rights issues, and institutional and private placements. Totals are net of one unit buyback 
arrangement that took place in 2007/08. Debt figures include new note issues, loans and successful refinancing of 
existing debt. To be included in a specific period, raisings must have been finalised by the end of the relevant financial 
year. 
Table 1: Equity and debt issues by A-REITs ($ 000,000) 
Source: ASX announcements (http://asx.com.au) 
The credit crunch post GFC has led to prohibitive debt pricing, especially given that Australian banks have over $46 
Billion of exposure to A-REITs (BDO 2010). The decline in collateralised asset values, rental income and an increase in 
borrowing costs have placed doubt on the viability of A-REITs needing to refinance. With foreign banks exiting this 
 2005/06  2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  
A-REIT EQUITY DEBT EQUITY DEBT EQUITY DEBT EQUITY DEBT 
ABP 90  60  100  211.4  
AJG         
LEP  350   -21.6    
APZ 152  104.4  12.6  104.5  
AJA 226  114.5 62.5 51.9 243.1   
AEU 39.2  40 70 20    
BWP       150  
CDP         
CFX   200 200  600 325  
CWT 2     167   
CPA 125 200    150 185.2 100 
CNR        0.247 
GPM 40  200      
GMG 350 115   1,500 4,016 1,065 720 
GPT  925 704    3,020  
IIF 187.8  890   1,785 200  
IOF 8  201.4 1,681.2 119.5  829.5  
ILF 229.9  155     15.5 
IEF 39    52.5    
LLA   175  25  100 200 
MGR   375 200 300 300 1,593  
RBV         
RNY         
SGP   75 620.6   2,280  
THG      685   
TSO 71.8  125.3      
TGP         
TCQ 114  97.6      
VPG 150  1,584.2  1,050 350 158 165 
WDC 17.8   2,500 3,000 1,100 2,900 700 
WOT 81.1  36.9 505     
TOTAL 1923.6 1,590.0 5,138.3 5,839.3 6,209.8 9,396.1 13,121.5 1,900.7 
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sector after the initial shock, the $4 Billion Australian Investment Business Partnership has been developed to support 
high quality Australian assets in need of funding. Lumsden et al (2009) state that the current environment is likely to 
make many features of the previous model difficult to replicate and will almost inevitably lead to a substantial review of 
the A-REIT structure. 
In this paper, we attempt to find the contemporary determinants of capital structure of Australian REITs between 2006 
and 2009, also examining the impact of the GFC on each of these determinants to find out how such a crisis alters the 
relationship between leverage and its explanatory variables. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of the major theories and past empirical findings where the overwhelming majority of work thus far has 
focused on an international context. Section 3 addresses our methodology, hypotheses and describes the variables and 
their rationale for inclusion. We present hypotheses based on theory and other expectations unique to the Australian 
market. Section 4 explains the data and presents regression results. Section 5 provides discussion and full interpretation 
of our findings. Section 6 provides a concluding overview. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical Development 
Modigliani and Miller‟s 1958 paper hypothesised that capital structure has no impact upon the value of the firm, given 
perfect capital markets, no taxes, bankruptcy, nor transaction costs. They then introduced corporate taxes and showed 
that firm value and its degree of leverage is positively correlated (Modigliani and Miller 1963). Miller (1977) then 
introduced the impact of both corporate and personal taxes to show that despite tax deductibility, the value of a firm and 
its structure are independent. Since these discussions, there has been a plethora of studies conducted, many with 
conflicting results. The literature is currently based around four primary theories.  
The Trade-off model developed by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) states that every firm maximises value by choosing 
an optimal debt to equity ratio. Miller and Scholes (1978), and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) contributed an association 
with tax, whereby as the firm increases leverage, the trade off occurs when attaining tax deduction benefits on interest 
paid and having access to additional capital without diluting the shareholder base. On the other hand, the firm assumes a 
greater risk of insolvency and bankruptcy costs by being less able to cover interest repayments.  They are also formally 
monitored to a greater extent by lenders and may have restrictive covenants placed upon them. The theory predicts that 
larger, more profitable firms are more likely to take on debt because they are financially healthier, with a lower 
probability of becoming bankrupt. They can also command lower rates of interest due to their greater scale of collateral. 
Stulz (1990) contends that the correct trade off between costs and benefits of debt leads to an optimal capital structure.  
Pecking Order Theory states that an optimal debt level does not exist. Rather, choices of capital depend on their cost, 
with internal funds being preferred to debt finance, and equity issues coming last (Myers 1984, Myers and Majluf 
1984). They also hypothesize that shareholders are sceptical of equity being issued when its price is overvalued and thus 
will react negatively. Managers anticipate this reaction, preferring to issue debt and avoid having to discount equity. 
Therefore, debt should only be undertaken in the absence of acceptable cash flow ahead of equity. 
There is also an asymmetric information problem whereby firms can reduce outside stakeholder scrutiny by using 
mainly internal, and to a lesser extent, equity funds. As opposed to the Trade off Theory, capital structure is a function 
of an entity‟s investment opportunities. The Market Timing Theory first postulated by Baker and Wurgler (2002) also 
suggests that there is no optimal capital ratio. Rather, firms will choose the type of capital that is mispriced to a greater 
extent. In terms of equity, a firm would be expected to make an offering when their existing share price is unsustainably 
overvalued. This is to fund projects with a positive Net Present Value whilst minimising their cost of equity and causing 
the least negative impact to existing share holders.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Easterbrook (1984) hypothesise that there is conflict between firm owners and both 
managers and debt holders. In particular, managers strive to maximise their own gains by using company resources, 
whilst not expending effort in the best interests of their principal equity holders. In this case it is optimal for the firm to 
pay out all of their free cash flow in dividends as to avoid any risky and inefficient investment. Consequently it is more 
beneficial to fund expansion using debt such that its utilisation can be formally monitored by the lender. Shareholders 
also indirectly gain the benefit of this type of monitoring (Jensen 1986). It appears as though the minimum earnings 
payout tax incentive of REITs directly addresses the Free Cash Flow Agency problem by eliminating the use of 
unmonitored retained cash flows.  
General Empirical Development 
With regard to previous empirical work determining capital structure, Bradley et al (1984) found that certain debt ratios 
depend on the industry the firm belongs to. The A-REIT market is an industry in its own right and competes with other 
entities for property investment funding, whilst assets are generally tangible and illiquid. Geltner and Miller (2001) 
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assert that given the higher net tangible asset values in REITs, they can afford to be more highly geared than non-
property related companies by offering greater collateral, whilst Myers (1985) concluded that the net tax gain to 
corporate borrowers is negative if their net marginal tax rate is zero. Fama and French (1998) concur with Miller (1977) 
that debt offers no net tax benefits, and find a positive relationship between dividends and firm value, whilst there is a 
negative relationship between firm value and debt levels. Given A-REIT tax rules, this implies that there is little 
incentive to use debt. Capozza and Seguin (1999) found that externally managed REITs have a higher debt ratio 
because external managers are frequently compensated according to the size of assets under management. This does 
give them incentive to gear up as much as possible to maximise their own personal remuneration, whilst internal 
managers are more concerned about escalating interest expenses.  
Harrison et al (2011) state that regulatory mandates which restrict REITs from investing in assets other than property 
limit diversification and increase the probability of financial distress. It can be argued that this isn‟t necessarily the case 
because rental property can be seen as a vehicle in which other types of commerce function. As long as there is 
diversification across different property types then we don‟t expect the core function of REITs to be significantly riskier 
all else being equal. 
The Trade-off, Pecking Order, Agency, and Market Timing Theories are assessed using the impact of certain 
independent variables upon capital structure. There has been no unequivocal evidence of „the‟ optimal structure, but the 
following studies have shown mixed results internationally using common independent variables which both support 
and refute the various theories at different points in time. 
Empirical Findings of Capital Structure Determinants Used in This Paper 
Harrison et al (2011) in their contemporary study of U.S REITs find increasing entity size to increase the debt ratio. The 
positive entity size relationship with the debt ratio is also found by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wiwattanakantang 
(1999), Booth et al (2001), Pandey (2001), Prasad et al (2003), Ariff and Hassan (2008) in their study of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, and by Chikolwa (2009) who studied a sample of 34 A-REITs just prior to the GFC. These results 
support components of both Pecking order and static trade off theories. Deesomsak et al (2004) also find a positive 
relationship and state that managers tend to make different decisions on capital structure internationally where there are 
different country considerations. They also found that the impact by explanatory variables was slightly, but not 
significantly altered in Australia by the Asian financial crisis. 
Profitability has been found to mainly have a negative impact on the debt ratio in support of Pecking Order and Trade-
off: Bankruptcy Costs Theories as per Titman and Wessels (1988),  Rajan and Zingales (1995),  Booth et al (2001), 
Fama and French (2002), Zoppa and McMahon (2002), Cassar and Holmes (2003), Hammes and Chen (2004), Morri 
and Berretta (2008), Westgaard (2008), Chikolwa (2009), and Harrison et al (2011), but has been positive and 
supporting of Agency and general Trade-off Theories as per Smith and Watts (1992), and Barclay, Morellec and Smith 
(2001). 
Asset Tangibility has mostly had a positive impact on the debt ratio, supporting Agency and Trade-off Theories as per 
Prasad et al (2003) and Suto (2003) for Malaysian entities, Harrison et al (2011) for U.S REITs, Ariff and Hassan 
(2008), and Deesomsak et al (2004), who found a positive relationship among Australian firms. There have been some 
deviations from expectations with no significant relationships found by Wiwattanakantang (1999) and a negative one by 
Booth et al (2001), both who studied Thai firms. The result of Booth et al indicates a substitution for long term at the 
expense of total debt. 
Earnings volatility or operating risk has mainly has a negative impact upon the debt ratio, supporting Trade-off Theory. 
Amongst numerous others, Booth et al (2001), Morri and Beretta (2008), and Chikolwa (2009) have found this result, 
whereas Wiwattanakantang (1999) found mixed results. 
According to Harrison et al (2011), REITs with high growth opportunities have a lower debt ratio and tend to use 
shorter maturity debt to avoid underinvestment. This supports Agency and Trade-off Theories as per Kim and Sorensen 
(1986), Titman & Wessels (1988), Ariff and Hassan (2008), and Chikolwa (2009) in Australia. However Feng et al 
(2007) find that high growth REITs have a larger debt ratio when significant. They also state that transactions of illiquid 
property assets increase monitoring costs which exacerbates the cost of equity and makes debt preferable despite the 
inability to claim tax deductions. Positive relationships are also found by Deesomsak et al (2004), Morri and Berretta 
(2008) and Giambona et al (2008) using total debt. These have been found to support Pecking Order Theory. 
Baker and Wurgler (2002), Deesomsak et al (2004), Ooi et al (2010), and Li et al (2007) all find that managers tend to 
issue equity during times when equity is overvalued, supporting Market Timing Theory. The latter authors also find that 
REITs differ from corporate entities by timing equity releases to reduce the impact of adverse selection. Howe and 
Shilling (1988) find that there is generally a positive market reaction to debt issues close to the announcement date, 
supporting the view that the market rewards greater monitoring and reduction in information asymmetry. 
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The presence of revenue generated outside Australia (GLOBAL) by A-REITs has generally shown a positive 
relationship with the debt ratio as per Ooi (1999), Newell (2006), Giambona et al (2008), and Chikolwa (2009). This is 
expected to occur because the geographical diversification of risk reduces the cost of debt. 
Table 2 outlines the expected relationship between leverage and its theoretical determinants based on previous 
literature. 
Table 2: Theories and the expected relationship between corporate factors and firm leverage 
 
Variables Expected theoretical 
relationship 
Mostly reported in the 
empirical literature 
Theories 
Firm Size + + Trade-off Theory: Bankruptcy 
costs/tax. Agency theory: 
Agency costs of debt. Other 
theories: Access to the market, 
economies of scale 
Pecking Order Theory 
 -  Other theory: Information 
asymmetry 
Profitability - - Pecking Order Theory. Trade-
off Theory: Bankruptcy costs. 
Other theory: Dilution of 
ownership structure 
 +  Trade-off Theory: tax. Free 
Cash Flow theory. Signalling 
Theory 
Tangibility + + Agency Theory: Agency cost of 
debt. Trade-off Theory: 
Financial distress/business risk 
Earnings Volatility/ 
Operating Risk 
- - Trade-off Theory: Financial 
distress 
 +  Agency Theory 
Growth Opportunities - - Agency Theory: Agency cost of 
debt. Trade-off Theory: 
Financial distress 
 +  Signalling Theory. Pecking 
Order Theory 
Share Price Performance - - Market Timing Theory 
METHODOLOGY, HYPOTHESES AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
In order to determine the catalysts of capital structure, each trust‟s leverage ratio is set as a function of a number of 
theoretically relevant trust-specific financial ratios. Using the Least Squares Dummy Variable Model, we estimate a 
panel equation in the following form: 
yit = αi + βXit + vit 
where    yit represents the debt ratio dependent variable, subscript i denotes the cross sectional dimension and 
subscript t shows the time-series dimension. 
α  is a scalar. 
Xit contains the set of explanatory variables in the estimation model. 
β is a column matrix of the partial regression coefficients. 
vit represents the remaining disturbances in the regression which varies with individual firms and time. 
 yit also represents a trust‟s debt per unit measure within a supporting regression to add an element of 
robustness to our results.  
 
Rather than using averaged variables over time as per Deesomsak et al (2004), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Pandey 
(2001), we have adopted a panel structure to rectify a small sample issue caused by the relatively small number of A-
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REITs continuously listed on the Australian Securities Exchange around the time of the GFC. The trust-specific 
independent variables include trust size, profitability, tangibility, operating risk, growth opportunities, unit price 
performance and global investment. The systematic independent variable dummy is the GFC, which is introduced in the 
2007/08 and 2008/09 financial years. These variables have previously been used with varying degrees of success in the 
literature both in Australia and abroad, except for the GFC. To our knowledge, this is the first time the impact of the 
GFC has been quantified with respect to capital structure decisions involving Australian REITs.  
 
The dependent variable, leverage, is expressed in three different ways. One of the most common ratios used is Total 
Liabilities to Total Assets (Rajan and Zingales 1995). This variable suffers inaccuracy for two reasons. Firstly, when 
assessing capital structure decisions, REITs should be considering interest obligations in changing economic 
environments. During inflationary periods, higher interest rates will contribute to increased risk by increasing the 
likelihood of the entity defaulting on their obligations. We therefore use only interest-bearing liabilities (debt) in the 
numerator. As a result, using Total Assets in the denominator is inappropriate because the converse of this debt ratio 
does not become the equity ratio. Rather, the converse becomes Equity plus Non Interest Bearing Liabilities divided by 
total assets. To avoid this inconsistency, we replace Total Assets with Interest Bearing Liabilities plus Equity, 
eliminating Non Interest Bearing Liabilities entirely from the ratio.  
 
Most previous studies have used size, growth opportunities, operating risk, tangibility, and profitability as variables due 
to their ability to test the large body of capital structure theory (Rajan and Zingales 1995, Chikolwa 2009). We have 
also used these variables and added unit (share) price performance as per Baker and Wurgler (2002) to add further 
insight. We also include two dummy variables in an attempt to capture the impact that the GFC and global diversified 
operations have on capital structure. 
 
Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural log of total assets. Larger entities are expected to have greater sources of 
revenue and therefore face lower risk of bankruptcy and as such, lower expected costs of bankruptcy. Large firms are 
subject to a greater number of debt covenants and scrutiny, therefore face smaller internal monitoring costs and agency 
costs generally. Large entities also tend to have less variation in cash flows and cheaper access to the credit market. The 
Trade-off and Pecking Order theories therefore both postulate that larger entities will borrow more due to their lower 
cost of debt, making this relationship likely positive. 
 
Profitability (NPATE) can be measured in several ways. We decided to use Net Profit After Tax divided by Equity due 
to its low correlation with other independent variables. According to Pecking Order Theory, managers prefer to fund 
projects using retained earnings because they are generally cheaper than using external finance. If this preference 
strictly holds true and there is no legal obligation to pay a fixed return to providers of external finance, then reportable 
profits would be higher. Thus a negative relationship between profitability and debt ratio is expected. Reducing the use 
of external funds in turn reduces external monitoring of the entity, magnifying the perils of the agency relationship. 
From this perspective, management has every incentive for this to occur, again eliciting a negative relationship between 
the variables. Trade-off Theory predicts that greater retained earnings are preferred in funding internal projects and 
paying off debt because alternatively increasing the use of debt would move the entity closer toward bankruptcy. We 
again see a negative relationship predicted by this theory. 
 
Alternatively, Trade-off Theory also postulates that increased use of debt allows greater tax deductibility for entities 
which are integrated in the tax system. However, the unique tax rule applicable to A-REITs provides a large 
disincentive to retain earnings, therefore this aspect of the theories does not apply as fluidly as it would expect to be 
applied to standard tax-paying companies. The major trade-off to unstapled A-REITs thus appears to be the cost of 
imposed taxes if high earnings are retained, versus the cost of debt and equity if these earnings are paid out. As half of 
our sample includes A-REITs that have been stapled to tax-paying corporations, we expect there to be a somewhat 
negative relationship because these corporations do have the ability to use retained earnings at cheaper cost without 
being penalised via the highest marginal tax rate. 
 
Tangibility is defined as the ratio of Tangible Property Assets to Total Assets. Agency theory hypothesises that entities 
with a high degree of borrowing are more inclined to invest inefficiently and transfer wealth from debt holders to equity 
holders. In return, lenders require tangible collateral to hedge their own lending risk if they are to continue. Therefore, 
as risky lending increases, the proportion of tangible assets should also increase to maximise entity liquidation value 
should bankruptcy occur. The alternative is that A-REITs that have intangible assets and cannot match collateral 
requirements imposed, must borrow at higher cost or raise more equity (Scott 1977). Neither of these latter two options 
would be preferred, thus the debt ratio and asset tangibility are always expected to have a positive relationship under 
both Trade-off and Agency Theories. A-REITs can be differentiated from corporate entities on another level with 
respect to tangibility. A-REITs have very little reason to capitalise neither Goodwill nor Research expenses, so their 
degree of tangibility is usually higher than that of companies. This is reflected by the propensity of A-REITs to gear up 
at a higher level and also indicates larger falls in unit values in comparison to company shares after the onset of a 
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negative financial event. Some A-REITs do however invest heavily in indirect property which lowers their levels of 
tangibility and ability to borrow. 
 
Operating risk is defined as the standard deviation of EBIT scaled by Total Assets. If an entity‟s earnings become 
uncertain, then so does their ability to repay debt obligations. We consequently expect management to reduce debt as a 
priority to avoid mandatory interest obligations that may precipitate financial distress, and expect that the relationship 
between the debt ratio and operating risk will be negative under Trade-off Theory. Under Agency Theory, a firm is 
expected to borrow more as it approaches financial distress. Directors have a fiduciary responsibility toward owners and 
are expected to redirect borrowed funds toward them as a priority to ensure that wealth is maximised, even at the 
expense of creditors. This type of activity is likely undertaken as a last resort and when the entity is no longer 
financially viable. 
 
Growth opportunities are usually measured in two ways. Firstly, Book Value of Total Assets less Book value of Equity 
plus Market Value of Equity, divided by Book Value of Total Assets. Secondly, Market Value of Equity divided by 
Book Value of Equity. We chose Market Value of Equity to Book Value of Equity arbitrarily in our models because as 
expected, they correlated highly with each other and yielded similar results. Under Agency Theory, higher growth 
opportunities provide incentives for management to invest sub-optimally by accepting risky projects with a high risk to 
return ratio (or have a high coefficient of variation) that may put debt holders at higher risk. This results in cost of debt 
rising such that use of internal funds or equity is preferred subject to taxation costs and the prevailing cost of external 
equity. Under Trade-off Theory, intangible growth opportunities place the ability of managers to service additional debt 
in doubt. As a result, a negative relationship is expected. Alternatively, legitimate low risk A-REIT growth 
opportunities may need to be funded with debt if the cost of debt is lower than taxation obligations triggered by 
retaining earnings. In this instance, a positive relationship is expected. Under Pecking Order Theory, A-REITs in 
particular, are expected to use debt before equity in the absence of retained earnings because it has a cheaper cost. Debt 
is cheaper because of high expected discounting of equity and the ability of debt holders to access assets first in the 
event of liquidation. Under Signalling Theory, an entity may wish to signal confidence in their legitimate growth 
opportunities, thus seeking further monitoring by borrowing more funds. Both of the above theories postulate a positive 
relationship with the debt ratio. 
 
Unit price performance is defined as the percentage change in average annual unit price. Our variable Unit Price 
Performance (UPP) has been included to test Market Timing Theory and to measure the expected impact on leverage of 
dramatic falls in market capitalisation post GFC. Theory-wise, new equity is expected to be issued at a discount, given 
the information asymmetry that exists between managers and potential investors. It is expected that entities would 
prefer to delay the issue of new equity until unit prices are relatively high so as to minimise the impact of discounting 
on the amount of capital they raise. This hypothesis stems from Market Timing Theory (Baker and Wurgler 2002), 
therefore when unit price performance increases, the debt ratio should decrease. Alternatively, further equity issues will 
dilute the unit holder base and earnings per unit, so if these concerns dominate, there may be no significant impact. 
 
Internationalising property investment opens up profitable opportunities on one hand, but also exposes A-REITs to a 
multitude of political and economic risks. Many A-REITs undertook overseas acquisitions prior to 2008 when the 
market was at its peak (BDO 2010). Empirical evidence has shown that A-REITs with a high international exposure 
have significantly higher debt levels (Newell 2006; Chikolwa 2009), yet have not increased their risk profile (Newell 
2006). Despite this, exposure to countries that have been affected by the GFC to a greater extent is expected to impact 
upon unit holder sentiment, especially when those asset values fall. In fact, the biggest falls in market value have been 
recorded by those A-REITs with exposure to weak off-shore markets and high levels of debt (Lumsden et al 2009). 
Given previous empirical evidence, debt levels are expected to rise with greater degrees of international exposure, but 
only during stable economic conditions. 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Data 
For our financial A-REIT data, we initially consulted the finance section of The Australian Newspaper to extract all A-
REITs currently listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. As at April 2010, there were fifty nine A-REITs listed. 
Our aim was to collect data for three years on either side of the GFC in order to gauge the differences in results that an 
unstable financial period may evoke. We found that over these years, there was a large turnover of listed A-REITs on 
the ASX and we were able to secure a statistically sound sample of forty two over four years. Consolidated financial 
statement data was taken from both trust websites and the Finanalysis database of company reports. We then calculated 
various ratios using this data. We next consulted Bloomberg for daily unit prices. However, despite our A-REITs being 
listed, much of the Bloomberg data was sporadic and unpublished. As a consequence, we could only use thirty two A-
REITs. After omitting Centro due to severe data fluctuations and outliers, we settled with a sample size of thirty one. 
Our sample of A-REITS used over the period 2006 to 2009 appears in the appendix, whilst Table 3 provides descriptive 
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statistics for the two dependent and six independent variables. We note that due to instability brought about by the GFC, 
several individual A-REIT observations lie slightly over three standard deviations away from their means. However, we 
included them in order to maintain minimum sample size integrity.  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
       
       
 Variables Mean  Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
       
 DEPENDENT      
       
 DDE 44.1623 42.8584 1.4294 98.4981 18.8039 
 DPU 1.6288 0.9492 0.0088 10.7147 1.9316 
       
       
 INDEPENDENT      
       
 SIZE 20.7831 20.6126 16.7182 24.7470 1.5788 
 NPATE -8.2150 9.4853 -327.8101 39.1585 55.9055 
 NTATA  86.9579 92.7782 7.1297 100.0000 15.9931 
 OPRISK 0.1387 0.0972 0.0134 0.6845 0.1229 
 MVBV  0.9253 0.8653 0.4747 2.9308 0.5170 
 UPP -10.7395 -2.6500 -95.5880 72.6421 34.0894 
Note: DDE represents the ratio of interest-bearing liabilities to interest-bearing liabilities plus equity, DPU represents 
the ratio of interest-bearing liabilities to number of equity units outstanding, SIZE represents the natural log of total 
assets and proxies the size of an A-REIT, NPATE is Net Profit After Tax divided by book Equity and represents 
profitability, NTATA is Net Tangible Assets divided by Total Assets and represents tangibility, OPRISK is the 
Standard Deviation of Earnings Before Interest and tax scaled by Total Assets and represents operating risk, MVBV is 
the ratio of Market Value of Equity to book Value of Equity and represents growth opportunities, UPP is the percentage 
change in average annual unit price and represents unit price performance. NPATE, NTATA, and SPP are expressed in 
raw percentages and Dummy variables have been excluded. 
Table 4 shows all of the non-dummy independent variables and their correlation coefficient relationships. We strictly 
adhered to minimum - maximum correlation limits of -0.6 to +0.6. 
Table 4: Correlation coefficients 
       
 SIZE NPATE NTATA OPRISK MVBV SPP 
SIZE 1      
NPATE 0.0626 1     
NTATA 0.2140 0.1957 1    
OPRISK 0.0008 -0.4739 -0.0526 1   
MVBV 0.2658 0.3487 0.1363 0.0339 1  
SPP 0.0217 0.4570 0.1149 -0.0024 0.5432 1 
       
Note: Dummy variables have been excluded 
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Empirical Results and Analysis 
Our results are separated into determinants of overall capital structure using the dependent variables „debt divided by 
debt plus equity‟ (DDE) (table 5) and „debt divided by number of units outstanding‟ (DPU) (table 6).  
Table 5: Dependent variable ‘debt / debt + equity’ (DDE) 
VARIABLE EXPECTED 
SIGN 
 COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC PROBABILITY 
INTERCEPT   75.2993  1.2452 0.2157 
GFC -   -4.4556 -2.4986 0.0140 
GLOBAL +    7.6666  1.5769 0.1177 
SIZE +   -2.2815 -0.8172 0.4156 
NPATE + -  -0.4294 -2.9203 0.0043 
NTATA +    0.1997  2.5392 0.0125 
OPRISK -      -40.8200      17.2949 0.0200 
MVBV + -   3.2330  4.9609 0.0000 
UPP -    0.0087  0.1561 0.8763 
GFC*SIZE     0.8252  3.3423 0.0011 
GFC*NPATE     0.2731  1.9092 0.0589 
GFC*NTAT
A 
   -0.1562 -9.3993 0.0000 
GFC*OPRIS
K 
      -22.3722 -1.2702 0.2067 
GFC*MVBV    -5.1689 -0.9661 0.3361 
GFC*UPP    -0.0545 -0.7279 0.4682 





0.3875     
F-
STATISTIC 
6.5577     
F-STAT 
PROB 
0.0000     
 
Table 6: Dependent variable   ‘debt / number of units’ (DPU) 
VARIABLE EXPECTED 
SIGN 
 COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC PROBABILITY 
INTERCEPT     -11.4135 -4.2522 0.0000 
GFC -      -1.3198 -1.6755 0.0967 
GLOBAL +        0.5412   0.5669 0.5719 
SIZE +        0.5266   3.8917 0.0002 
NPATE + -      -0.4041 -8.6119 0.0000 
NTATA +        0.0953   5.9499 0.0000 
OPRISK -    -10.2980 -8.4841 0.0000 
MVBV + -       1.6307   2.5375 0.0126 
UPP -        0.0049   0.2234 0.8237 
GFC*SIZE         0.0302   0.2613 0.7943 
GFC*NPATE         0.3944   8.2516 0.0000 
GFC*NTATA        -0.0801  -3.8279 0.0002 
GFC*OPRISK         4.1642   0.8836 0.3789 
GFC*MVBV        -1.1225  -0.8907 0.3750 
GFC*UPP        -0.0242  -0.8738 0.3841 
      
ADJUSTED R
2
 0.5170     
F-STATISTIC 10.4036     
F-STAT BROB 0.0000     
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Note: Tables 5 and 6 are estimation results of ordinary least squares panel regressions on 124 observations. The 
dependent variables are the ratio of debt to debt plus equity (DDE), and the ratio of debt to total units outstanding 
(DPU). The independent variables are GFC: approximated by a dummy value of 1 in 2008 and 2009 or 0 otherwise; 
Global: approximated by a dummy value of 1 if an A-REIT owned assets based overseas or 0 otherwise; Size: natural 
logarithm of total assets (SIZE); profitability: NPAT divided by book equity (NPATE); tangibility: book value of 
tangible assets divided by total assets (NTATA); operating risk: standard deviation of EBIT scaled by total assets 
(OPRISK); market perceptions of growth opportunities: total market capitalisation divided by book value of equity 
(MVBV); market perceptions of performance: percentage growth in unit price relative to the previous year (UPP). The 
F-statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. The adjusted R² shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables 
that can be explained by the independent variables. Two panel regressions are given for four years between 2006 and 
2009, along with interaction variables to gauge the impact of each independent variable post GFC.  
DDE has the potential to give dubious results because it relies on the underlying equity value to be stable. During 
volatile financial periods, A-REIT asset values may need to be downgraded to reflect either their market value or more 
directly, potential to earn future income according to Australian Accounting standards. Significant decreases may 
„increase‟ a debt ratio and be an unintended consequence, not reflecting managerial capital structure intentions. We 
therefore supplement our results with a further regression using the number of units outstanding in the denominator to 
ascertain their validity. The number of units outstanding is not compromised by volatility in asset values, nor volatility 
in market value. In fact, the DPU dependent variable is naturally magnified only when A-REITs deliberately issue 
further equity. We argue that it is therefore a better measure of managerial capital structure decisions despite itself being 
a capital structure proxy. Deesomsak et al (2004) analysed the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on Australian 
companies, but also stated that this crisis itself had no impact on Australia in general. To our knowledge ours is the first 
study incorporating the effects of a large and relevant financial crisis in Australia.  
INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION 
Both of our models show similar results, which appears to validate the use of our DPU proxy. We analyse results in 
both models and give reasons where applicable for any significant deviations. Table 7 replicates the expected and 
mainly reported relationship between the independent variables and capital structure, alongside our results over the 
entire sample period and post GFC. Table 8 shows our support or otherwise for the various theories and the variables 
concerned.  












Firm Size + + + + 
Profitability +/- - - + 
Tangibility + + + - 
Earnings volatility/ 
Operating risk 
+/- - - +/- 
Growth 
Opportunities 
+/- - + - 
Share/Unit Price 
Performance 
- - + - 
 
A-REIT size (SIZE) has a negative and insignificant impact on leverage in our DDE model but is positive and highly 
significant at the 1% level in our DPU model. Size can be a proxy for the quantity of information that managers have to 
convey to the market (Morri and Berretta 2008). The negative impact of size in our DDE model may highlight that 
smaller entities pay relatively more than large entities to issue new equity (Morri and Berretta 2008). Another 
possibility is the uptake of relationship lending amongst smaller entities, whereby lenders also rely on provision of 
„soft‟ information. This is particularly important given the riskier environment caused by the GFC.  The positive DPU 
result is consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wiwattanakantang (1999), Booth et al (2001), Pandey (2001), 
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Prasad et al (2003), Chikolwa (2009), Deesomsak et al (2004), and Harrison et al (2011). It also supports both Pecking 
Order and static Trade-off Theories (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Fama and French 2002, Feng et al 2007, and Ang et al 
1982) where larger A-REITs have a lower probability of bankruptcy and can borrow at lower cost.  
After the onset of the GFC, both models show that larger A-REITS with more debt (or smaller A-REITs with less debt) 
increased leverage by even more, although only the DDE model shows this to be significant, being so at the 1% level. 
Intuitively, we could conclude that large falls in equity values led to a dubious DDE ratio result but we also raise some 
other possibilities. This increase may have been specific to short term debt because equity and long term debt are 
relatively expensive for smaller entities to issue (Morri and Berretta 2008), particularly during periods of instability. 
This is evidenced by the smallest ten entities increasing gearing by an average of 21% in 2009 (BDO 2010). This 
increase in gearing also suggests that smaller A-REITs were unable to efficiently raise sufficient equity capital. We also 
see that smaller A-REITs are more likely to undertake cheaper short term debt during unstable periods, where short 
term debt rollovers help reduce the risk of insolvency. 
The effect of profitability (NPATE) on leverage is negative and significant at the 1% level in both models. This finding 
is consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al (2001), Zoppa and McMahon (2002), Cassar and Holmes 
(2003), Westgaard (2008), Hammes and Chen (2004), Fama and French (2002), and Titman and Wessels (1988), and 
Harrison et al (2011), but inconsistent with Smith and Watts (1992), and Barclay, Morellec and Smith (2001). In a raw 
sense, our result would support Pecking Order Theory for entities that are able to retain earnings and use less debt, but 
because debt becomes first preference in the absence of retained earnings, we refute this theory for this variable. In 
terms of Agency Theory, it appears that more profitable A-REITs could have been attempting to reduce debt in order to 
reduce the degree of external monitoring. This effect is exacerbated due to the greater earnings that can potentially be 
„mismanaged‟ with less scrutiny. Our result also supports Trade-off Theory whereby more profitable A-REITs prefer to 
reduce cheaper debt for the greater fear of approaching bankruptcy, especially where they are not integrated with the tax 
system. Given our strong result and inclusion of stapled A-REITs in our sample, lower debt usage suggests that tax 
deductions play little or no part in the gearing decision, weakly refuting the tax component of Trade-off Theory. 
After the onset of the GFC, both models show that more profitable A-REITs with lower debt ratios had increased debt. 
Our DDE and DPU models show these to be significant at the 10% and 1% level respectively. We believe that possible 
reasons for this revolve around the credit shortage and banks‟ greater unwillingness to lend funds after the GFC onset. It 
appears that stricter lending criteria and the scarcity of funds had made it more likely for more profitable (or less 
unprofitable) A-REITs to obtain debt finance at the expense of less profitable A-REITs. With some facing fast expiring 
debt facilities, it may have been less costly to promptly refinance where they could and to avoid the uncertainties 
involving drawn-out, more expensive equity issues. From a theoretical perspective, it appears as if Pecking Order 
Theory prevails and both Agency and Trade-off Theories are refuted when analysing profitability during an unstable 
period. The reasons appear to be more opportunistic when facing urgent expiry deadlines rather than focusing on long 
term net costs. 
The relationship between leverage and tangibility (NTATA) is positive in both DDE and DPU models and significant at 
the 5% and 1% level respectively. This is inconsistent with Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Booth et al (2001) but 
consistent with Prasad et al (2003) and Suto (2003) who find a positive significant relationship for Malaysian entities, 
Harrison et al (2011) for U.S REITs, and Deesomsak et al (2004), who find a positive relationship among Australian 
entities. Long term debt is typically used to fund larger asset purchases over a longer period, and thus incorporates a 
duration premium within its cost. All or part of this premium may translate into lenders‟ demand for collateral. The pre 
GFC period also coincides with a greater number of long term property purchases and an increase in long term gearing 
at the height of the economic cycle. Our results show strong support for Agency Theory whereby collateral 
opportunities in the form of fixed charges increases with the level of debt. If the relationship were negative, then we 
would see A-REITs with lower levels of tangibility borrowing at higher cost, also contravening Pecking Order Theory. 
Trade-off Theory is also supported by our results because with a higher number of tangible assets, losses to creditors are 
minimised should default occur. We also see support for these theories anecdotally where the A-REIT market in general 
is more highly geared than non A-REIT entities and has a higher degree of tangibility with real estate assets in the 
absence of Goodwill and Research & Development.  
With onset of the GFC, both models show that highly tangible A-REITs reduced debt levels at the 1% level of 
significance. This result may simply reflect negative asset revaluation once economic pessimism lowered the present 
value of expected future income generated by assets. In turn, the magnitude of collateral fell and it appears that both 
Trade-off and Agency theories hold with respect to tangibility. Lowering of debt levels aims to reduce the impact of 
default on creditors and also minimises the cost of debt where lenders would otherwise be under-collateralised. 
Operating risk (OPRISK) has a negative impact upon debt levels and is significant at the 5% level in our DDE model 
and at 1% in our DPU model. This result supports Trade-off Theory whereby volatile earnings make financial distress 
more likely. A-REITs appear to have reduced leverage on this basis in order to reduce mandatory interest repayments 
and reduce the risk of distress. Our result contradicts Agency Theory whereby debt levels increase with earnings 
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volatility in order to ensure managers maximise unit holders‟ wealth whilst they can at the expense of debt holders. As 
Agency Theory is refuted in this case, we can suggest that the A-REIT market is not at the critical stage where its 
viability is in jeopardy. The converse would have suggested a last-ditch attempt to appease unit holders before the 
metaphorical ship sinks.  
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After the onset of the GFC, our results are mixed in that A-REITs with volatile earnings and lower debt levels either 
further reduced debt (DDE model) or increased it (DPU model). Both are insignificant and suggest that the Trade-off 
Theory, despite holding in prosperous times is not quite as rigid during an uncertain period where it is expected to be 
even more so.  We suggest that the lack of significance is due to risky A-REITs expecting such financial results and 
having previously reduced debt levels in preparation for further volatility. It is also possible that A-REITs with high 
operating risk were slow to react in reducing debt levels when faced with the uncertain magnitude of the GFC. Looking 
back at Table 1, debt issues increased from $5.8 Billion in the 2006/07 financial year to $9.3 Billion in 2007/08, before 
falling to $1.9 Billion in 2008/09. 
Growth opportunities (MVBV) have a positive relationship with gearing levels. It is significant at the 1% level in the 
DDE model, and at 5% in the DPU model which is consistent with the results of Deesomsak et al (2004), Giambona 
(2008), and Feng et al (2007). This finding contrasts with the findings of Chikolwa (2009), Titman & Wessels (1988), 
and Harrison (2011), and generally with studies using companies that are not bound by the same degree of regulation 
and tax exemption that A-REITs are. Our results do not support Agency theory, whereby A-REITs with high growth 
potential are expected to shy away from lender monitoring. Theory states that there is potential to undertake 
opportunities that are more risky than optimal, with cost of debt reflecting this risk. A-REITs‟ preference to borrow 
clearly does not reflect an increased cost of debt, nor does it suggest a propensity to engage in super risky projects. In 
contradicting Trade-off Theory, intangible growth opportunities also do not appear to be placing debt serviceability in 
doubt. In this case, growth opportunities seem to be substantiated, eliciting more optimism than the theory gives it credit 
for. This blends in better with signalling theory where high-growth A-REITs may be borrowing more as a signal to the 
market that their strategy will withstand further monitoring. In contrast with our result, many studies of U.S REITs have 
shown that growth opportunities are not typically funded with debt. We see that as a sign of undertaking more 
aggressive, risky growth strategies without the pressure of additional monitoring in a more competitive and condensed 
U.S REIT market.  
After onset of the GFC, A-REITs with higher growth opportunities and increased debt levels appear to have reduced 
gearing in both models, although this result is insignificant. In a weak sense, there is a slight indication that managers 
may have been trying to reduce the scrutiny of lenders after revising the expectations of their projects. It is more likely 
however that A-REITs saw greater volatility in growth opportunities post GFC and followed Trade-off Theory by 
reducing debt and mandatory interest payments with more expensive equity funding. This signifies a potential move 
away from confident signalling to lower monitoring when growth is impaired.  
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Unit Price Performance (UPP) has a positive relationship with the debt ratio but remains highly insignificant in both 
models. Our positive result contrasts with that of Deesomsak et al (2004), Baker & Wurgler (2002), Li et al (2007), and 
Ooi et al (2010). This result contrasts with Market Timing Theory by suggesting that higher unit prices elicit greater use 
of debt. Our explanation is that despite the potential to raise sizeable amounts of equity capital when unit prices are 
high, debt was relatively inexpensive pre GFC and on average, it seems there may have been a desire to not dilute the 
unit holder base. Drawing on Table 1, the total debt issued in our sample in the 2005/06 and 2006/07 financial years pre 
GFC was $7.429 Billion whereas total equity issued over the same period was $7.062 Billion. These similar figures help 
to explain that there was no specific preference for equity despite unit price performance being considered healthy. We 
are able to contend that A-REITs don‟t appear to have taken advantage of information asymmetry by strategically 
offering equity when units were overvalued. Even if price performance did lead to more equity being issued, it must be 
proven that unit values were positively deviating from their intrinsic value in order to assert that managers 
opportunistically acted upon information asymmetry. 
After onset of the GFC, A-REITs with superior market performance and higher debt levels appear to have reduced debt 
but the impact remains insignificant in both models. The lack of impact could be due to the fact that despite tremendous 
falls in market capitalisation initially from December 2007, a large number of A-REITs were actively raising equity 
capital in our sample to improve their financial position as seen in Table 1 ($19.331 Billion equity to $11.297 Billion 
debt). Anecdotally, this refutes Market Timing Theory and again shows that the GFC appears to have distorted 
decisions that managers may have planned to make under stable economic conditions. Either way, there was no 
definitive relationship over this sample time period. 
The presence of revenue generated outside Australia (GLOBAL) by A-REITs shares a positive relationship with the 
debt ratio. Both our models show that this relationship is insignificant in contrast to Ooi (1999), Giambona (2008), 
Newell (2006), and Chikolwa (2009), albeit slightly falling outside the 10% significance level in our DDE model. It 
appears that the benefits of international diversification and its array of political, economic and financial risks blur any 
impact in this case. This is despite many A-REITs having undertaken overseas acquisitions prior to 2008 when the 
market was at its peak and not having increased their risk profile (Newell 2006). With the onset of the GFC, however, 
exposure to countries like the U.S that have been affected by the GFC to a greater extent is expected to impact upon unit 
holder sentiment, especially when those asset values fall. This invites a case for attempting to limit debt exposure where 
overseas asset values fall even further. In fact, the biggest falls in market value have been recorded by those A-REITs 
with exposure to weak off-shore markets and high levels of debt (Lumsden et al 2009). Given previous empirical 
evidence, debt levels are expected to rise with a greater degree of international exposure because geographical 
diversification reduces risk and lowers the cost of debt, but this appears to occur during stable economic and financial 
conditions. 
Finally, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has had a pronounced negative impact in both models, being significant at 
the 5 % and 10% levels in the DDE and DPU models respectively. Its general negative impact reflects the concern of A-
REITs of being overexposed to debt when revenues are uncertain. There prevails a two-pronged effect. The first 
conforms with Trade-off Theory whereby uncertain revenues place the ability to cover mandatory interest repayments 
in doubt. A-REITs then actively attempt to reduce this default risk by issuing equity to pay off debt. In some cases, 
equity issues assisted in making interest payments where profitability was highly negative in the 2007/08 and 2008/09 
financial years. The GFC also reduced the supply of loan funding and led to a tightening of credit policy. This means 
that A-REITS were scrambling to secure refinancing of debt facilities while they could, and to a greater extent, 
obtaining equity capital despite heavy falls in unit prices. The second effect comes into play when asset values fell and 
„artificially‟ rose debt ratios despite A-REITs having not varied their nominal debt significantly across financial years. 
Higher debt ratios in turn raise the cost of debt because lenders run the risk of the loan-to-value margin decreasing or 
even becoming negative as was seen with Centro. Again, the desire to secure equity capital despite its low price and 
high cost shows that this strategy was the lesser of two evils compared to the potentially prohibitive cost of debt, 
increased monitoring and risk of bankruptcy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Australian listed property sector is an unique market in its own right, and given the conflicting determinants of 
capital structure in numerous previous research, the GFC has created an environment where the effect of the classic 
determinants seem to become distorted. This does not mean that the way in which they interact with the debt ratio is 
illogical, but rather appear to achieve an outcome that is focused on A-REIT survival rather than managerial 
opportunism. We tested the robustness of the traditional capital structure model (DDE) by using a second model (DPU) 
with a proxy debt ratio measure. The results were very similar and the proxy model was found to have reflected capital 
structure decisions better. We believe that this was the case because the DDE variable incorporates large variations in 
the book equity denominator which are somewhat beyond managerial control during periods of market volatility. 
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Our results are similar to those found in both REIT and corporate entities internationally and show that several 
explanatory variables have differing impacts where the GFC does play a part in affecting capital structure decisions. 
Our results show that determinants of A-REIT capital structure and their signs compare similarly with those of U.S 
REITs and given conflicting results abroad, it is difficult to give definitive reasons. A-REITs were however more 
prompt than U.S REITs in issuing significant equity post GFC and this is a likely reason our capital structure currently 
has a lower proportion of debt. U.S REITs only recently had close to $20 Billion of equity issues in 2010 and their debt 
levels remain at 50% as opposed to A-REITs at 30% (St Anne 2011).  
Capital structure theories including Pecking Order, Trade-off, Agency, and Market Timing Theories were both 
supported and refuted in our study, depending on the interplay of certain independent variables with the level of debt. It 
is important to note that by confirming that a particular theory holds true, we do not necessarily discount another as they 
are not mutually exclusive, rather they provide insight into capital structure decisions from different perspectives and 
under a changing financial environment. 
There is potential for further research in terms analysing long term impacts of financial crises, including the degree and 
timing of possible reversion back to the status quo. The impact of traditional determinants on both long and short term 
leverage decisions can be compared given the invisible optimal capital structure that exists under different 
environments. There is also greater scope for more research with U.S REITs, as the GFC has had the largest impact 
there and should provide more dramatic differences across different periods.  
Generally, as the A-REIT sector attempts to ride out the effects of the GFC, we expect a more passive investment 
strategy, with less active investment in property development and a more simple financial structure to appeal to more 
risk-averse equity holders. We hope that lessons have been learned within the financial industry and that the listed 
property sector will in future position itself with a sustainable mix of capital at every stage in the economic cycle. 
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List of A-REITs included in the sample 
  
Name ASX Code 
  
Abacus Property STP ABP 
Agricultural Land Unt AGJ 
ALE PRP GRP STP LEP 
Aspen Grp STP APZ 
Astro Jap Prop STP AJA 
Aust Education UNT AEU 
Bunnings Warehouse UNT BWP 
Carindale Prop UNT CDP 
CFS Retail Prop UNT CFX 
Challenger Winetr UNT CWT 
Commonwealth Prop Ord UNT CPA 
Coonawarra Aust UNT CNR 
GEO Prop Grp STP GPM 
Goodman Grp Forus GMG 
GPT Grp STP GPT 
ING Industrial Fd UNT IIF 
ING Office FD STP IOF 
ING Re Com Grp STP ILF 
ING Real Est Ente UNT IEF 
Living & Leisure Grp STP LLA 
Mirvac Grp STP MGR 
Rabinov Prop Tr UNT RBV 
RNY Prop Tr UNT RNY 
Stockland STP SGP 
Thakral Holdings UNT THG 
Tishman Speyer UNT TSO 
Trafalgar Corp STP TGP 
Trinity Grp STP TCQ 
Valad Prop Forus VPG 
Westfield Grp STP WDC 
Westpac Office Tr UNT WOT 
 
TOTAL 
 
31 
 
  
